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INTRODUCTION

The American legal profession is experiencing a revolution in the way
legal services are provided and how consumers access those services.'
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Ph.D. University of Chicago. J.D. Harvard Law
School. I am grateful to Elizabeth Chambliss, Doni Gewirtzman, Bruce Green, Molly Land, Ed
Purcell, and Bradley Wendel for their comments on this Article. The Article benefited from the
insights of the participants in the Hofstra Law School Roundtable on Ethics organized by
Professor Susan Fortney. I would also like to thank N.Y. Law School for its research support.
1. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, Three Generations of US. Lawyers: Generalists,
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373 (2011); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROw's
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2014). For a good effort to organize the new

forms of legal services, see Jordan Furlong, An Incomplete Inventory of New Law, LAW 21 BLOG
(May 13, 2014), http://www.law2l.ca/2014/05/incomplete-inventory-newlaw/. Among other
changes in the profession inspired by the increasingly global and technology driven marketplace
is a push for deregulation. Benjamin H. Barton, Economists of Deregulation of the American
Legal Profession:Praise and Critique, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 493 (2012). While deregulation
might be a welcome innovation, it also implies a faith in the marketplace. Id. Before we surrender
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Without fully understanding this shift, we are struggling to grasp what
some have called a crisis in legal education. 2 As we meet these
challenges, it is important to embrace innovation and change while
preserving what has been valuable and useful about the legal profession
in the past. By exploring the history of professional independence, this
Article seeks to elaborate what is essential and worth maintaining as the
profession adapts to the changing market for legal services. The answer
has important implications for the future of legal education as well as the
regulation of the legal profession.
As a part of the assault on professionalism, critics argue that the idea
of professional independence is empty rhetoric, designed to mask
protectionist and self-interested conduct as necessary measures to ensure
lawyers' self-sacrificing dedication to the public good.3 This particular
criticism is part of a larger prediction and celebration of the end of the
American legal profession.4 Without advocating a mindless return to the
way things once were, this Article serves as a reminder that the idea of
completely to the forces of the market, this Article serves a reminder of some of the advantages
of a more guild like approach to the professions. Once we recognize the advantages, the next step
would be to see if we can integrate them into a more modem and dynamic approach to the delivery
of legal services.
2. STEPHEN HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRIsIS 54 (2013); PAUL
HORWITz, WHAT AILS THE LAW SCHOOLS 955 (1913); WALTER OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE:
LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN OVERLAWYERED AMERICA (2012); Paul Campos, The Crisis of the
American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 177 (2012); Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis
Rhetoric, andCompetition in Legal Education:A SociologicalPerspective on the (Latest) Crisis
ofthe Legal Professionand Legal Education, 24 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 503 (2013); Paul Horwitz,

What Ails the Law Schools, I11 MICH. L. REV. POL. 955, 956 (2013); see Richard A. Matasar, The
Rise and FallofAmerican Legal Education,49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 465, 496 (2004); William D.
Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will it Last ifLaw Grads
Can't Pay Bills?, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/the lawschoolbubblehow longwill it last if lawgrads cantpaybills/.
3. See, e.g., THOMAS MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010).
4. Id.; RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES (2008); Richard K. Greenstein, Against Professionalism,22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327
(2009). For a classic discussion of the decline in professionalism, see RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 226-49 (1989). Recently, Daniel Markovits has concluded that the

professional life ends in tragedy because life of a lawyer is not worth living given the growingly
diffuse and diverse nature of legal practice. DANIEL MARKOVITs, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS:
ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN THE MODERN AGE 212-47 (2012). The prediction of the end of the
legal profession as we know it is not new, but the challenges facing every generation of lawyers
is different. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
ProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229 (1995). MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SoL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN
MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1994).
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professional independence has been beneficial. At the very least, it has
provided a useful way for lawyers to talk about, develop, and redefine
their role in a constantly evolving democratic system.' As such, it is worth
thinking about how we can preserve the ideal of independence without
ignoring the reality of a changed legal landscape.
The criticism of the concept of independence is not new. The
historiography of professional independence echoes the current hostility
toward the legal profession.6 Professional independence, historians like
Jerold Auerbach argue, is part of a rhetoric that has served to support the
interests of a particular economic and social class. It is part of a language
of professionalism used to exclude outsiders, artificially inflate
professional status, and sustain market monopolies.7 Oddly, this
Marxist/Weberian critique of professionalism has survived, almost
unchanged, for decades. 8 Without refuting the valuable insight of
Auerbach and others who have developed this critique, this Article
articulates an alternate narrative to explain the persistence of
professionalism, by focusing on professional independence. 9
To that end, I have unearthed three controversies in which lawyers
debated perceived threats to both the profession in particular and
democratic ideals in general in terms of professional independence. By
doing so, I resurrect a more beneficial and positive use of the term, which
can be sustained as the profession itself changes. Together, these three
episodes demonstrate that the notion of professional independencewhile always hazy and vague-is not merely a tool in a self-interested
pursuit of market interests. It is also part of a language of professional
identity, an evolving understanding of what it means to be a lawyer in
America. Lawyers have used the idea of independence to elaborate a
common identity and debate what that shared identity means at any given
time. While they might never agree and, if they do, history might prove
any of their assumptions wrong or misguided, I argue that the process
itself is worth preserving, as it allows for the evolution of the profession's
role. This in turn pushes an individual lawyer to connect her work to a
5. For an interesting discussion of the critical role of professionalism in preserving the
rule of law and democratic values in China, see Sida Liu et al., The Trial of Li Zhuang: Chinese
Lawyers' Collective Action Against Populism, I ASIAN J.L. & SoC'Y 79 (2014).
6. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA45-46 (1976).
7. Id. A few historians have presented alternative narratives of the profession and
professionalism. See e.g., Terrence Halliday, The Idiom of Legalism in Bar Politics: Lawyers,
McCarthyism, and the Civil Rights Era, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 911 (1982); SAMUEL HABER,
THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900 (1991).
8. For a summary of the Marxist-Weberian critique of the professions, see ABEL, supra
note 4, at 14-40.
9. For my first article developing this argument, see Rebecca Roiphe, A History of
Professionalism:JuliusHenry Cohen and the Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM

URB. L.J. 33 (2013).
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larger purpose, even when the nature of that larger purpose remains
elusive.
Drawing on my conclusion that independence is an aspect of
professional identity rather than a condition that results from the isolation
of lawyers from businessmen and others, I argue that the concept has been
marshaled to support unwarranted goals. The real threat to independence
does not come from innovative markets, sources of funding, or new law
firm structures, as many assume.o The danger, instead, arises from
proposals to segment the profession in ways that might erode a common
identity and divorce lawyers from a shared history." Reconceiving
professional independence in this way renders it flexible enough to
survive the massive changes in the profession while continuing to shape
the nature of the profession and its aspirations.' 2
Critics tend to focus on the pernicious uses of professional
independence, but, like most concepts, it is an elastic ideal which has
been used for disparate purposes.1 3 It has not served one constituency,
ideology, or program, but it has consistently provided a language for
debating the nature of the lawyer's role in a democracy. While the idea
of professional independence has been used for both trivial and selfserving purposes, it has also served as a reminder of the value of lawyers
in a democracy. It has provided a language, albeit an imprecise one, to
discuss and debate the evolving role the profession must play as the
landscape changes.14
10.

Michele M. Destefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the

Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2791, 2793 (2012) (arguing that the bar has been
misguided in its restriction of multidisciplinary practice); Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson,
Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposalfor Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L.

REv. 1, 30-37 (1998) (arguing against the bar's position on nonlawyer investment in law firms);
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 749, 797-800 (2010) (arguing against
ownership and investment restrictions).
11. The most prominent proponent of this kind of segmentation is Brian Tamanaha. See
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 167-86 (2012).

12.

Sociologist Herbert Kritzer argues that the professions are going through a

revolutionary transition. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions are Dead, Long Live the
Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 713 (1999).

Kritzer argues that the professions will take a radical new form rather than simply becoming
extinct. Id. As such, it is critical to preserve what has been useful about the profession in the past
by recasting professionalism in a way that can survive the many changes in the profession. By
reconceiving professional independence as an aspect of professional identity, the concept will be
able to survive the changes that have already revolutionized the delivery of legal services in
America.
13.

AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 40-73.

14.

Aziz Rana has argued that work provides an important site for individuals to participate

in and contribute to a democratic community. Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe?: Legal
Independence and the Problem of DemocraticCitizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1665, 1694-99

(2009). It is hard for work, alone, to serve this function. Work combined with a sense of shared
history and identity, however, can, as sociologist Emile Durkheim suggested, provide a way for
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Given this essential function, it is critical to resist recent calls to
dissolve the notion of a unitary legal profession entirely. The ideal of a
lawyer's independence (which is only coherent if we preserve the
integrity of a profession united at least in some way) provides a language
with which to discuss the lawyer's role in society. While it has been
abused and corralled into service of self-interested pursuits at times, it has
also brought lawyers together in an evolving and useful dialog about what
it means to be a lawyer and the role the profession ought to play in a
democracy. The conversation itself has proved helpful in pushing
ourselves to define and redefine, criticize and justify, in search of a
common professional identity.
By unearthing different historical understandings of independence
and how the term has been used at different times, what agenda it has
served, this Article also suggests that we ought to use the term in a more
precise manner. The ABA has made grand claims about independence.
For instance, the 1992 MacCrate Report insisted that the practice of law
is "a single public profession of shared learning, skills and professional
values" and that self-regulation is essential to ensure "independence from
government domination, permitting the profession to be an important
force in preserving government under law .. ."
This sentiment has
been invoked so many times to support unnecessary and self-interested
proposals that it is in danger of losing any potential to motivate a useful
debate over the future of the profession. The distinction between a
profession and a business does not capture the full meaning of
independence. It is confusing and leaves the concept open to obvious
criticism. 16 Identifying what particular aspect of independence is at issue,
and what values are really in jeopardy, will help move the conversation
away from the platitudes that are bandied about in the wood paneled bar
association meeting rooms to a more concrete discussion of practical
import.
Building on decades of literature about the legal profession, many
critics believe that professionalism is at best an empty, and, at worst, a
individuals to interact productively in a complex modem society. If we relinquish the notion of a
profession entirely, we give up that potential. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC
MORALS 10-14 (Comelia Brookfield trans., Free Press 1958).
15. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING

THE GAP 119-20 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
16. Pearce, supra note 4, at 1246-63. The functional sociologists acknowledged that the
distinction between the professions as public service and business as self-interested is
oversimplified and inaccurate. See Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34-35 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1954); Talcott Parsons, A
Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370 (rev. ed.

1954).
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destructive term. 17 Some are ready to dispense with the idea entirely
along with a notion that there is anything unique about those who practice
law.' 8 Others feel sure that the profession itself is about to dissolve as we
splinter into specialties that have little to do with one another.19
Sociologists have explained that increased specialization and the spread
of information technology have created conditions that put the
professions in jeopardy. 2 0 Legal scholars have echoed this prediction. 2 1If
there is any potential to preserve something useful about professionalism
it will derive from the skills that all lawyers share, despite the increased
specialization. 22 Similarly, given that technology has democratized
access to knowledge and information, it follows that if professionals
contribute anything unique, then it must be in their technique or approach,
which cannot be disseminated as easily as information and knowledge.
In the same spirit as those who would have us abolish the profession,
critics have called for radical restructuring of legal education. 2 3 Critics
have suggested two-year law schools, segmentation, specialization, and
other reforms. 24 This Article uses the new definition of independence and
professionalism to argue that if we move to a different model of legal
education, we should retain some common ground-we should not forget
to engage in the difficult conversation about what positive attributes
ought to draw the profession together. If professional independence is a
product of group identity then the process of socialization through
education is key in instilling the sense of a common mission. 25
There are unique risks in the proposed segmentation of law schools
17. Id.; MORGAN, supra note 3, at 19-40; SUSSKIND, supra note 4.
18. See Pearce, supra note 4, at 1263-76; MORGAN, supra note 3, at 19-40; SUSSKIND,
supranote 4.

19.

Sociologists have explained that the professions have become increasingly segmented

and specialized over the course of the last century. See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History
of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994). Specialization, other theorists argue,
threatens the idea of a unified profession. Simon H. Rifkind, Shift to Specialization Biggest

Change in Law, N.Y. L.J., May 23, 1988, at S36. The MacCrate Report comes to a similar
conclusion. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 15. TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 42 (1992).

20.

Kritzer, supra note 12, at 726-28.

21.
22.

MORGAN, supra note 3, at 6-9; SUSSKIND, supra note 4.
One such skill unique to lawyers is the ability to relate with clients. See CAROLL SERON,

THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 106

(1996) (describing the importance of the personal relationship with the lawyer to clients).
23.

TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 1-8; Campos, supra note 2, at 215-16.

24.
25.

Campos, supra note 2, at 215-22.
A number of scholars have written about law school and the process of socialization.

See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, "Chasingthe Wind": PursuingSocial Justice, OvercomingLegal MisEducation, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1167 (2004);
Robert Granfield, Constructing ProfessionalBoundaries in Law School: Reactions of Students
and Implicationsfor Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 53, 64-70 (1994).
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into top tier, which would train our country's leaders in industry and
government, and bottom tier schools, which prepare tradesmen for the
"simple" work of representing clients. 26 Aside from the misguided
assumption that only large firm lawyers and national policy makers need
access to a complex theoretical understanding of the law, there is also the
risk that lawyers lose a common ground, which is valuable. While
innovating, law schools and professionals should remember to ask: What
is common to the practice of law? What unites all lawyers in common
professional identity? And, what has been useful and productive in the
profession in the past? This Article begins to answer these questions by
resuscitating a history of professional independence, which has been
useful in the past.
To make this argument, Part I of this Article will provide a basic
definition of professional independence with the understanding that the
term is complex and vague and has shifted in meaning over time. This
first section will also explore the origin and meaning of independence
around the time of founding. Part II of this Article will provide three
examples of how American lawyers have employed the term throughout
the twentieth century. Finally, I will use these examples to explore the
implications of these anecdotes. Part III will draw two conclusions. It will
emphasize how these three examples, taken together, provide a historical
counterargument to the current eagerness to dispense with
professionalism and the notion of professional independence along with
it. It will also draw on these three episodes to conclude that professional
independence ought to be seen as an aspect of professional identity, not
a product of structural relationships. Therefore, professional
independence cannot support the ABA's opposition to multidisciplinary
practice, outside funding of law practice, and non-lawyer investment in
lawsuits.
The same forces that have led to innovation in legal practice and
education-globalization and advances in information technologymake this project more critical. As we move to a global legal community,
as we work with other countries, with other legal systems, it is important
to locate and retain what it is that is valuable in the history and traditions
of the American legal profession. The market pressure to compete and
conform, along with the exciting project of innovating, can lead us to race
into the future without consulting the past. This project serves as a break
to that momentum. It concludes that a profession, which aspires to be
independent of its clients, popular opinion, and the government, in all its
vagueness, is a critical component of a democratic state and one that we
should not relinquish without a fight.
26.

The most prominent proponent of this model is Brian Tamanaha. See TAMANAHA,

supra note 11, at 167-86.
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This conclusion helps shape heated contemporary debates about the
profession. First, it contributes to the literature on the professional role
by arguing that ethics is not grounded in morality or politics, but rather
in the nature of the work lawyers do in balancing contradictory interests.
Second, it helps clarify and shape pressing conversations about the
regulation of the profession and the future of legal education. And finally,
it articulates a conception of independence and professionalism that is
capable of surviving the recent, monumental changes in the profession.
I. INDEPENDENCE: DEFINITION AND ORIGIN

This Part offers a brief definition of independence and then sketches
its origin and development throughout American history. Doing so
establishes a basic meaning for the term but also highlights how plastic
the concept has been.
A. Definition
Louis Brandeis defined professional independence in a famous speech
entitled, "Opportunity in the Law." 27 He explained that lawyers ought to
hold a "position of independence, between the wealthy and the people,
prepared to curb the excess of either." 28 This is, of course, just one
articulation of many. Professor Robert Gordon has masterfully
deconstructed and outlined the various understandings of
independence. 29 He suggests that independence can denote corporate
self-regulation or control over the conditions of the lawyers' work.30
Gordon, however, focuses more closely on a third use of the term-the
profession's status as a "separate estate." 3 1 By this, he means two things.
First, law yers are ideally independent from the State.3 2 As such, they can
act to ensure that the government abides by its own laws. 33 Second,
lawyers are independent from clienteles, which allows them to protect the
public and guard the rule of law from the selfish grasp of powerful
factions. 34
Like Gordon, I am mostly concerned with the idea of independence as
a separate estate, guarding against the power of both the government and
27. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical
Society (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 329 (1914).
28. Id. at 337.
29. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 1-30 (1988).
30. Id. at 6-8.
31. Id. at 9-10.
32. Id at 10-11.
33. Id.
34. Id at 11-29.
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substantial private interests. In this concept of professional independence,
lawyers hover somewhere between clients and the government or the law.
They fight to effectuate their clients' interests but they do so by
negotiating, counseling, and arguing about the meaning of the country's
shared norms, which are (albeit clumsily) articulated through positive
law."5 That very purpose ingrained in our sometimes unrealistic
aspirations for lawyers is a part of an identity that derives from the work
all lawyers do in trying to realize private interest through the confines of
the law.36
Recently, lawyers and regulators have invoked professional
independence to debate practical reforms, like whether or not to allow
outside investors in law firms and whether lawyers ought to be able to
practice alongside other professionals, such as accountants and social
workers. 3 7 Motivated by a purported fear that these arrangements would
undermine lawyers' independence, the American Bar Association has
declared that this kind of deregulation would mark the end of the
35.

For the role of law and politics in shaping lawyers' ethical obligations, see W. BRADLEY

WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).

36.

Public choice theorists have undermined a romantic notion of the law as the articulation

of the will of the people, and it would at this point be naYve to equate law with public interest. See
JAMES M. BUCHANAN,

POLITICS WITHOUT ROMANCE: A SKETCH OF POSITIVE PUBLIC CHOICE

THEORY AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 11 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds., 1984). As Bradley
Wendel has argued, however, the law is an institution we have introduced to allow us all to live
in harmony. WENDEL, supra note 35, at 210. It is the closest we have to common, agreed upon

values. Id. Even if it is a product of lobbying power and particular interests, lawyers are
nonetheless in a constant dialogue between their clients and the laws and procedures that their
clients have agreed to obey. Lawyers are obligated to serve their clients within the bounds of the
law and that latter restriction means something more than just what the client can get away with.
W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L.

REV. 1333, 1341-49 (2009).
37. As early as 1990, lawyers warned against the dangers of multidisciplinary practice to a
lawyer's independence. L Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms that Practice Law Only:

Society's Need, the Legal Profession'sResponsibility, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 249,262 (1990). The
American Bar Association set up a commission in 1998 to explore the question of
multidisciplinary practice. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/commissionmultidis

ciplinary practice.html. The Commission recommended, "Lawyers should be permitted to share
fees and join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal
professional services . . . provided that the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to
assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Report,

available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/commissionmulti
disciplinarypractice/mdpfinalrep2000.html. See also Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary
Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some

Implicationsfor the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1128-32 (2000); DeStefano,
supra note 10, at 2791-94; Nora Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63

DEPAUL L. REv. 377 (2014); W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Financingand AntiCommodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2014).
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American legal profession as we know it.3 8 Many critics of the bar
dismiss the notion of independence as so much empty rhetoric. 39 They
argue that the ABA is using this language, as it has always done, to
promote and simultaneously mask the economic self-interest of its elite
constituents. 40 According to this critique, the Bar uses the term as a
subterfuge to sustain unwarranted monopolies and control over the
market. 4 ' In recent years, as the global legal market has put pressure on
the American legal profession to take a more flexible, creative approach,
this particular debate has reached a fevered pitch. By exploring alternate
meanings and uses of professional independence, this Article cautions
those who oppose the ABA's approach to refrain from discarding the
useful and beneficial aspects of independence along with the sometimes
reactionary agenda that it has been used to support.
The question of a lawyer's independence also informs an age-old
debate about how active a lawyer ought to be in directing and curbing the
wishes of his client. Professional independence is key, in other words, in
helping lawyers assess their role in protecting the interest of third parties,
the community, and the integrity of the justice system as a whole. Lately,
this debate has renewed vigor. Independence from clients allows lawyers
to take a broader perspective, to view the long-term interests of the client
alongside the well-being of the public. 42 Others claim that this sort of
independence undermines the client's autonomy and that lawyers ought
to be independent in an almost opposite sense. If a lawyer is independent
of a client, as the argument goes, then she does not need to take
responsibility for the client's values or objectives. Even the most
unpopular causes deserve legal representation and an independent lawyer
can provide that representation because doing so does not involve an
endorsement of the client's values or agenda.4 3 This debate assumes, like
the one concerning multidisciplinary practice and outside ownership of
law firms, that the key issue is a lawyer's independence from the client.
38. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPracticeand the American
Legal Profession:A Market Approach to Regulatingthe Delivery ofLegal Services in the Twenty-

First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 83, 85o88 (2000).
39.

MORGAN, supra note 3.

40. Id.
41. This is the narrative that many historians have told about the rise of the legal profession
in the twentieth century. See generallyAUERBACH, supra note 6.
42. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-77 (1988); Gordon,
supra note 29, at 13; see William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV.

1083, 1090-118 (1988) [hereinafter EthicalDiscretion].
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representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
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But at other points in history, the bar has emphasized that there are public
passions, mob instincts, private interests, and factions that ought to be
checked, and the lawyer stands perfectly poised to do so.44
Another understanding of professional independence concerns the
lawyer's independence from the state. Independence in this iteration
counters the dangers that arise when lawyers are too deeply beholden to
the courts or the executive branch. The fear is that we will end up with a
docile bar, unwilling to question the government, protect the rights of
individuals, or challenge the legitimacy of government action when
necessary. This notion of independence is part of what justifies
professional self-regulation. It is built on the idea that the rule of law
cannot exist without a separate class of lawyers policing the government
to ensure that it behaves lawfully.
This Article offers context for the current debates. It serves as a
reminder of what professional independence has meant in the past, and
the purposes it might serve in the future. If we dispense with the notion
of a profession that is unified in some aspect, we lose this capacity to
discuss and shape lawyers' role. The idea of a coherent and useful
professional identity becomes meaningless and obsolete. If we dispense
with the notion of a lawyer's independence because it has been used in
the past for selfish, destructive purposes, we also lose the possibility that
it might be marshaled for productive goals as well. In addition, by
emphasizing that the useful aspects of professional independence have
emerged historically as a product of group identity, this Article offers new
insight into contemporary debates about the lawyer's role.
B. History ofProfessionalIndependence
The idea of professional independence traces back to the Federalist
Papers.4 5 In Federalist 35, Alexander Hamilton wrote,
Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a
neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of
industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them,
ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive
to the general interests of the society? 4 6

As Professor Aziz Rana has explained, Alexis de Tocqueville made
this idea explicit when he theorized that the American legal profession
constituted an American brand of aristocracy. 47 In his travels to America
44. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1-30.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
46. Id.
47. Rana, supra note 14, at 1669.
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in the 1820s, Tocqueville wrote, that lawyers are by training, "arbiters
between the citizens." 48 They provide a check on the passions of the mob,
by curbing the blind and senseless immediate needs that would destroy
the whole.49
So, it follows, lawyers should remain removed from clients to avoid
association with any particular faction or agenda. By doing so, they
would be able to maintain sound judgment and direct clients' desires
toward socially productive ends. They would use their own judgment and
in so doing prevent any single group-no matter how rich or powerfulfrom taking over the judicial process and harnessing the government for
its own ends.5 0

The term independence derives from civic republican political
thought, an ideology that defined the founders' theoretical framework and
shaped much of America's initial political structure. 5 ' At the center of
this ideology was the commonwealth ideal, the commitment to the public
good over any particular interest. In this worldview, the government had
only one goal: to foster and promote the good of the community. 52 In
order to take part in the social and political world, an individual had to
have sufficient means to think beyond his own narrow self-interest. He
needed some degree of financial security to be free from the influence or
sway of another. In republican political thought, independence from
one's own immediate needs and from the demands of others could only
be obtained when a citizen was wealthy enough to be free from selfinterest and could act to benefit the entire community instead of himself
or some segment of society to which he belonged.5 3 But independence
was something more than wealth or land ownership. It was also a quality
of mind, an aspect of character that insulated an individual from outside
pressure. Significantly, republicanism assumed that any kind of skill or
training, like land ownership, could enable someone to be independent.54
According to republican theory, an independent member of society
could exercise virtue because he could provide for his own basic material
needs. The virtuous citizen would subordinate his own self-interest to the
good of the public. This civic devotion, critical to the well-being of the
republic, comprised the only true sort of freedom-the freedom from the
bonds of immediate self-interest, the freedom to deny one's own selfish
48.

See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (George Lawrence trans.,

J.P Mayer ed. 1988).
49. Id.
50. Gordon, supra note 29, at 15.
51. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 46-90
(1969) [hereinafter CREATION].

52.
53.

Id. at 54.
Id.

54. GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178-79 (1991)
[hereinafter RADICALISM].
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demands for the sake of larger community."' The central goal of the
republican government was to ensure and promote virtue among its
independent citizenry 56
Republican political thought was not new at the founding and it was
not necessarily democratic.5 7 In the seventeenth century, most political
theorists assumed that only the landed gentry possessed sufficient
independence to exercise virtue. America was born in a different spirit
but as James Madison explained, a system of checks and balances was
necessary to ensure that the republic was not as vulnerable as it might
otherwise be to the inevitable lapses in virtue.5 s For a while, most
revolutionaries believed that ownership of even a small parcel of land
could ensure independence. 5 9 Virtue, as Thomas Paine noted, was not
hereditary. 6 0 It could be earned through education. 6 1 As the young
republic grew older, however, more political leaders feared the malicious
and irrational whims of the masses. As they watched groups of citizens
take over state legislatures and enact laws with what they perceived as
divisive and factional agendas, leaders grew even more concerned about
relying on the supposed virtue of the citizenry. 6 2
Any just society would need to protect against this sort of tyranny. It
could be tyranny of the powerful few or a tyranny of the mob. The only
way to ensure against such domination was to promote a virtuous and
independent citizenry capable of subordinating its own selfish will to the
good of the community.6 But as time wore on, and the powerful demands
of the populace grew to be a greater challenge, more people joined those
who worried that the country needed a smaller, more elite group to guard
against corruption. A landed gentry would have been a natural choice.
But not in America. In America, some believed that lawyers could serve
this role.
In Federalist 35, Alexander Hamilton suggested that even landowners
had a motive to promote their own financial interest, but professionals
were perfectly situated to direct individual energy toward the good of

55. CREATION, supra note 51, at 61-62.
56. Linda K. Kerber, The Revolutionary Generation:Ideology, Politics, and Culture in the
Early Republic, in THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY 25-49 (Eric Foner ed., 1990); CREATION, supra
note 51; see generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIEVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).

57.

See CREATION, supra note 51, at 60-61.

58.

THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 300 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).

59.

RADICALISM, supra note 54, at 178-79.

60.
61.

Idat 181.
Id.

62.

See generally RADICALISM,

supra note 54; BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL

ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).

63.

CREATION,supra note 51, at 68.
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all. 64 In hindsight, many would surely disagree with his premise, but
Hamilton explained that, as a class, "the learned professions .. . form no
distinct interest." 65 As such, they could ensure against the domination of
any one faction and direct each person's energy toward the good of all.
As Tocqueville concluded, the education and training of lawyers
perfectly suited them for this task.66 Lawyers, a new democratic--or at
least meritocratic-aristocratic class, would see to it that the general
population acted for the good of all rather than for themselves as
individuals or for some faction with its own particular agenda. The
mastery of the science of the law, the learning, and the education suited
lawyers for leadership. They would be close to the people, enmeshed in
the people's everyday problems, yet never blinded by them. Lawyers
would prove a perfect check on the passions of the people, preventing the
kind of tyranny that republicanism anticipated and dreaded. Thomas
Jefferson echoed the sentiment. 67 He imagined a "natural aristocracy," a
class of wise statesmen who would guide the population toward its best
course. 68 Unlike the landed gentry in Britain, this group would be chosen
by merit. 69
As the country grew older, lawyers picked up on the theme. George
Sharswood, whom some have called the father of professional ethics,
argued that lawyers must serve a leadership role because through
argument, interpretation, and counseling, lawyers bring the government
"home so nearly to every man's fireside." 70 -David Hoffman, another
influential founder of American legal ethical discourse, similarly
elaborated the role of lawyers as caretakers and guardians of American
democracy. 7 ' Hoffman made explicit the assumption underlying
Alexander Hamilton and De Tocqueville's expression; it was
professional expertise that situated lawyers to serve the good of all. 72 It
was their training and the scientific nature of the law. So, independence
64.
65.
66.
67.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).

Id.
Gordon, supra note 29, at 14-20.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in I THE FOUNDERS'

CONSTITUTION 568-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), cited in Rana, supra note

14, at 1676 n.36.
68. Id.
69. Id
70.

GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 31 (1834).

71. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the OriginalUnderstanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381, 389-91 (2001); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE

REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 109 (1965). Some place the lawyer's rise to social prominence
later, after the Civil War. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 107-08 (1995).
72.

DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES (1817).
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in this new iteration was no longer based on land ownership or material
wealth, but rather knowledge, learning, and science. It was this special
training that lent the American legal profession its unique ability not only
to subordinate its own interests but also to guide others to do the same.7 3
Historians have catalogued lawyers' decline from this exalted
position. The narrative explains that they abandoned their role. Captives
of their clients' interests, lawyers would do anything for a fee. The
criticism and sense of betrayal poured in almost as soon as the rhetoric
elaborated lawyers' exalted position in society.7 4 Some said it was the use
of retainers, which make lawyers too closely beholden to a particular
client's interest.75 Or perhaps the dominance of the corporate bar at the
turn of the twentieth century led to lawyers' decline. 76 Others blamed it
on diversity7 7 or suggested it was the 1960s with its emphasis on
individualism and anti-elitist sentiment. 78 Recently, Professor Norman
Spaulding has cast doubt on the entire thesis, suggesting that lawyers
never assumed the position of civic leaders in the first place. 79 They were
always practitioners devoted primarily to their clients' ends.8 0
As interesting as the debate on the so-called declension thesis may be,
for my immediate purpose, it hardly matters. What does matter is that the
rhetoric existed once and still does. We are left with an accumulation of
language and ideas over time. Some amalgamation that at a very high
level of generality goes something like this: Lawyers are a critical
component of a modem democracy because their training, experience, or
devotion to the law situates them to direct private passions and particular
interests toward a socially productive goal, which will benefit everyone
in the end. Their role as lawyers places them at a remove from clients and
distances them from government. By definition, lawyers bring
73.

Id; Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics

Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 254-55 (1992) [hereinafter Rediscovering]. There has been
some controversy about just how different Hoffman and Sharswood were. Some believe that
Sharswood presented an approach to lawyering more consistent with the civic republican model,
more focused on obtaining and promoting a common good. They argue that Hoffman was more
focused on serving clients regardless of the ultimate good of their cause. Others counter that

Sharswood and Hoffman were more similar than one would think. Both of them believed that a
lawyer's goal was to achieve justice. Bruce Green, "PublicService Must Begin at Home": The
Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice,50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1228-29 (2009).
74. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 4.
75. Robert Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer: A Brief Informal History of a Myth With Some

Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169, 187-88 (2009).
76. Gordon, supra note 29, at 58-59.
77.
78.

KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 165-383.
Russell Pearce, The Legal Profession as A Blue State: Reflections on Public

Philosophy, Jurisprudence,andLegal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339, 1342, 1359-60 (2006).
79.

Norman Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogatingthe Ideology of

Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1397, 1397-99 (2003).
80. Id
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government into the interstices of individual lives. As such, they can
shape the way individuals interact with the public, while making sure that
the agencies of government do not overstep their bounds as well.
But lawyers are subject to corruption. The profession is a weak and
precarious guardian of the commonwealth. The rhetoric of degeneration
and decline is, in fact, built into the civic republican theory of political
growth. Civic republicanism embraces a cyclical view of history: virtue
leads to wealth, and wealth inevitably breeds corruption, devolution, and
the destruction of virtue. So, it is no surprise that the notion of sickness,
decline, and imminent death plays its part in the language of the
professional role as well.8
While the question of professional decline is clearly an important one,
which has preoccupied historians and scholars for quite some time, I am
more interested in how the rhetoric of a lawyer's independence, including
the language of betrayal and broken promises, has been used over time. I
am interested in whether this rhetoric is something worth maintaining or
whether we can afford, as some scholars have suggested we should,
dispense with it entirely.
It is easy to dismiss the early praise of lawyers' independence as selfcongratulatory rhetoric and no doubt that is, to some extent, true. It is
worth noting, however, that the language lawyers invoked to describe
their role in the polity included religious imagery and images of war.
Thus, in the 1880s on the eve of the founding of the American Bar
Association, lawyers referred to themselves as "priests at the altar of
justice." 82 Lawyers, they explained, go into battle and wage war for the
well-being of all. 83 The rhetoric (similar to that of civic republicanism)
shows that the profession, for a time, at least, viewed itself as a kind of
secular priesthood or army of elite officers.
The language of independence made its way from Hoffman and
Sharswood into the Canons of Professional Responsibility.8 4 In 1908, the
then-young American Bar Association decided to commit some of its
ethical principles to writing.85 These standards were aspirational. As
Professor Russell Pearce has demonstrated, the Canons translated the
republican political vision into a set of hopes or standards for the legal
profession. The Canons officially hoisted lawyers into the role of
81.

See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept ofLegal Professionalism,

1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN

L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). See generally POCOCK, supra
note 56.
82. Hon. Daniel Dogherty, Some Reflections on the American Bar, Its Integrity and
Independence, 22 AM. L. REv. 177, 179 (1888).
83. Id.
84. Pearce, supra note 73, at 267-70.
85. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 1-44 (1999).
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guardians, protecting the common good from the intrusion and corruption
of factional and particularized interests.86 For instance, Canon 30 stated
that a lawyer "advances the honor of his profession and the best interests
of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law." 87 Canon 15 noted that a lawyer "must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client." 88
The Model Code of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1970, many
decades after the original Canons, provided the first set of enforceable
rules along with a more detailed set of aspirations, labeled "ethical
considerations." 89 The idea of a lawyer's professional independence
shaped many of the rules and standards. A lawyer, for instance, was not
supposed to assert a belief in the justness of a client's cause. 90 As
Professor Robert Gordon has explained, this is because there is a core of
a lawyer that cannot be bought and sold. 9 1A lawyer's political and moral
convictions remain apart from the representation, arming the lawyer with
the capacity to counsel, urge, direct the client or if need be, resign from
the representation. 92 A lawyer similarly is not bound to take any case and
can draw from arenas other than the law in counseling his or her client. 9 3
In the 1950s, the independence of lawyers found new champions in
the functionalist sociologists who saw the professions as necessary to
articulate and promote shared values in a world that was becoming
increasingly atomized and commercialized.94 But the celebration of
expertise and specialized learning as the source of a disinterested capacity
to direct society toward common values soon met a formidable critique.
In the decades that followed, historians and sociologists attacked the
functionalist view as naYve and paternalistic. Marxists and Weberian
scholars demonstrated how the class of professionals-supposedly
dedicated to the common good-had mostly promoted the interests of an
elite few at the expense of women, ethnic, and racial minorities. The
entire rhetoric of professionalism masked the deep schisms in society, the
86.

Id

87.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTY Canon 32 (1908).

88.

Id. at 15.

89. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1970).
90. Id. DR. 7-106(c)384; R. 3.4(c); CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS OF THE AM. BAR ASsoc.,
Canon 15.

91.

Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 13,31-32 (1988).

92.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2013). See also id R. 1.16(b)(4)

(allowing the lawyer to withdraw when the "client insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement"). See Gordon,
supra note 29, at 11-12.
93.
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incurable ills of a capitalist world. Professionals disguised power and
oppression as science and fact, dangerously hiding their own agenda
beneath the guise of objectivity. 95

The republican ideal of a disinterested independent lawyer, while no
longer popular, seems to have sustained the assault that began in the late
sixties and seventies on the professional project. The idea still makes its
way into Professional Responsibility classes and bar addresses. 96 The
organized bar still uses the notion of professional independence to resist
regulatory changes or promote agendas. 97 The fact that the concept of
professional independence is so resilient, however, does not alone justify
its continued worth or power.
II. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN CONTEXT

Historians have chronicled the famous invocations of professional
independence. They have marked the origins of the term as I have done
and noted how it made its way into the rules of professional
responsibility. But there is a long stretch of history in between. What
became of the concept of a lawyer's independence? Robert Gordon in his
article on the subject sought to understand what conditions promote
independence. 98 Others, as I have noted, have simply dismissed the
concept as so much empty (and dangerous) rhetoric. 9 9
Rather than fill in the story by describing the progression of the notion
through the past two centuries (a Herculean task), this section has a much
more modest goal. It will recount three different episodes in the history
of the legal profession, in which a lawyer's independence proved an
important theme. By doing so, it serves as a reminder. As scholars and
regulators point to the abuses committed in its name, it is worth
remembering that the notion of professional independence has a more
illustrious past. By unearthing these debates, this Part also provides a
warning. If we dispense with the idea of a separate legal profession, if we
give up a sense of professional identity, and with it a notion of a lawyer's
independence, we give up the possibility of this sort of discourse. Finally,
taken together, the three episodes frame professional independence not
as an ideology, but as an aspect of identity. By doing so, the history offers
a new frame for the ongoing debate over the profession's relationship to
democratic ends.

95.

Roiphe, supra note 9, at 46-51.

96.
97.

MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 118, 135.
MORGAN, supra note 3, at 40-49.
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Gordon, supra note 29, at 29-67.

99.
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A. Defending the Robber Barons
Every era has its villains. In the late nineteenth century, or the Gilded
Age, it was the robber barons. Robber barons, like Jay Gould and
"Diamond" Jim Fisk, were corrupt businessmen, infamous for amassing
huge sums of money at the expense of the public and ruthlessly
destroying competition that stood in the way of their fortune. 0 Industrial
capitalism had raced into the modem age after the Civil War and the
robber barons were quick to take advantage of a regulatory framework
0 They paid their workers poorly and kept
that had not yet caught up.o'
them in notoriously dangerous conditions.' 02 They artificially suppressed
prices until they could buy out their competitors and create monopoly
rates for their wares, at which point they would raise the prices and reap
the rewards.1 03
History has moderated the view of these wealthy capitalists. Perhaps
they were not quite as evil as they seemed at the time. They were, after
all, just a product of an economy in the midst of turbulent change. Some
have even argued that they brought a degree of order to the chaotic
market.1 04 But at the time, in the Gilded Age, as the country was
struggling with its own ambition, they were seen by many as
representative of all that had gone wrong in American society.
In the midst of this, in 1868, the well-known and controversial
lawyer, 0 s David Dudley Field represented Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and
Jim Fiske, three of the most notorious industrial capitalists of the time, in
their struggle with Cornelius Vanderbilt for control of the Erie
Railroad.1 06 Gould and Fiske were trying to gain control over Albany and
Susquehanna Railway to obtain a growing monopoly hold on access to

100. See generally MATTHEW

JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN

CAPITALISTS, 1861-1901, at 32-50 (2011); TIM MCNEESE, THE ROBBER BARONS AND THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT: RESHAPING AMERICAN BUSINESS 48-65 (2009).
101. McNEESE, supra note 100, at 13-67.

102. Id.
103. BURTON W. FOLSOM, JR., THE MYTH OF THE ROBBER BARONS: A NEW LOOK AT THE RISE
OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA 121-35 (1987).
104. Id.; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); ALLAN NEVINS, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER: THE HEROIC AGE OF
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE (1940).

105. David Dudley Field, the son of a New England minister and brother of the United States
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common law and his tireless but ultimately failed fight for codification in New York. David
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the Northeastern states. 0 7 Gould was doing the same with the market for
gold. 0 8 Field's decision to represent the robber barons was
controversial. 09
As if matters were not bad enough, in 1870, a committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York initiated an attempt to
prosecute William "Boss" Tweed, the infamous corrupt head of the
Democratic political machine in New York."o After the committee
refused his overtures to represent it in the matter, Field agreed to
represent Tweed-an unpopular decision, to say the least.'
Field's choice, his decision, and the reaction of both bar members and
the public illustrate how critical the notion of independence was to the
conversation. Professional independence framed the debate between
Field and the public about the proper role of lawyers in a democracy. This
conversation proved especially useful as the country was adjusting to
fairly dramatic changes in the nature of the industrial marketplace. There
was no way to comprehend the idea of a professional duty to clients or to
the public without it. It was not that professional independence provided
the answer. It did not. But it made the dialogue possible. And the
discussion, in turn, allowed the profession to evolve to meet, and in some
way shape, the increasingly complex demands of a changing society.
In 1871, Samuel Bowles, the renowned journalist and editor of the
Springfield Republican, published a letter condemning Field for his
"professional association with notorious parties, with generally conceded
corrupt schemes."ll 2 The author of the letter, clearly too offended to leave
107.

Francis, supra note 106, at 41-80.

108. JOSEPHSON, supra note 100, at 143-46; Henry Adams, The New York Gold Conspiracy,
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ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970, at 63-67 (1997).
111. Id at 66.
112.
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Dudley Field, 3 ALB. L. J. 81, 82 (1871) [hereinafter The DutiesandRights ofCounsel]. The letter,
reprinted in the N. Y Times in full, read:

David Dudley Field, though hardly old enough to be called a veteran is one of
the ablest lawyers in New York, and has by far the largest practice. His receipts
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has destroyed his reputation as a high-toned lawyer with the public, while the bar
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is an authority on international law, and also a chief codifier of the present code
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the debate with such an accusation, added that Field was the "king of the
pettifoggers," a term that was as pejorative a stab at a lawyer as one could
find at the time." 3 Bowles apologized for the personal attacks but stood
by the condemnation of his representation of Gould and Fiske: The
reaction of your old friends in Western Massachusetts is one of "mingled
sorrow and indignation at your professional associations with Fisk and
Gould and their desperate schemes."" 4
Field responded, "The storm of abuse that is poured upon me is really,
however designed, an attack upon the independence of the bar.""i5 He
explained, "They who hate a client fancy, in their folly, that if they can
frighten his advocate they may destroy the client, not reflecting that they
would thus weaken their own security."" 6 Field sought to justify his
position by invoking the independence of the bar. By representing an
unpopular individual, Field argued, a lawyer is standing up for the law,
the ability of the courts and the process to sort out justice. He is not
standing with his client, vouching for his client, or as Bowles had
suggested, endorsing the client's actions or beliefs."'
Field might have stopped there but instead he invoked Thomas
Erskine, the British lawyer and politician, who famously defended
Thomas Paine against accusations of seditious libel for his publication of
the Rights of Man." 8 In a much quoted phrase, Erskine explained his own
controversial choice: "I will forever, at all hazards, assert the dignity,
independence, and integrity of the English bar, without which impartial
justice, the most valuable part of the English constitution, can have no
existence.""' So, perhaps, independence ensures the lawyer's distance
from the client such that it secures the right of every man accused of a
crime or wrongdoing to counsel. The lawyer, as Erskine went on to
explain, is not the judge. He sits by his client, offers a defense, and lets
the judge determine the correct result.
knowledge of technicality and once during a legal controversy with the late

James T. Brady, the latter dubbed him the 'king of pettifoggers' which title has
stuck to Field ever since.
Id. at 81. Editorial, Jim Fisk's Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1870 [hereinafter Fisk's
Lawyers]. The correspondence was also printed in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD & SAMUEL
BOWLES, THE LAWYER AND His CLIENTS 1 (1871) [hereinafter FIELD & BOWLES].
113. FIELD& BOWLES, supra note 112, at 1.

114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. This understanding of independence resembles Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.2(b) ("A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or
activities."). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2015).
118. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 285-86 (1985).
119. LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE (1947).
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But Bowles disagreed. Erskine, he pointed out, was defending an idea,
a noble cause. He was fighting for the freedom of the press, the right, as
he went on to say, of the individual, "to seek to change the public mind
by the conviction which flows from reasonings dictated by
conscience."l 20 Independence, according to Bowles, did not imply the
right of the lawyer to represent just anyone regardless of his conduct.'21
Offended by the comparison between Field and Erskine, Bowles insisted
that Field was not a hero standing up for a client who expressed unpopular
ideas, but rather a lawyer who was lending his significant skills to
powerful individuals who had brought "temporary disorder to the
financial condition of the country, and spread ruin, with a wanton hand
among its people." 22 Field was abusing technicalities in the law to help
these sorts of men avoid justice. Even the worst of villains deserve
representation, but why do they deserve Field's particular talents? 2 3
In response, Field countered with his understanding of independence:
A lawyer is not responsible for his clients' conduct but rather for the
"manner in which he conducts their causes."1 24 He explained, "I know no
better general rule than this: that the lawyer, being entrusted by
government with the exclusive function of representing litigants before
the courts, is bound to represent any person who has any rights to be
asserted or defended." 25 But Bowles had a different notion, insisting that
Field had "offended the moral sense of the public."' 26 Extrapolating from
what he considered journalists' ethics, Bowles concluded that Field's
view was simply wrong.1 2 7
The New York Times agreed with Bowles.' 28 In 1870, the paper ran an
editorial attacking the lawyer's choice to defend the Erie "villainies."l 29
The paper dismissed the notion that it is the duty of the lawyer to accept
all cases offered them insisting that all lawyers discriminate in their
practice.1 30 In response to a defense in the New York HeraldTribune, the
editorial staff of the New York Times commented that representing Fisk
was not the same as representing an accused murderer.131 By representing
120. Id.
121. See id
122. The Duties and Rights of Counsel, supra note 112, at 84.
123. For a contemporary collection of essays addressing this problem, see How CAN You
REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013).
124. The Duties and Rights of Counsel, supra note 112, at 88.

125.

Id. at 84.

126.

The Correspondenceof Mr. David Dudley Field & Mr. Samuel Bowles, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 30, 1871, at 1-2.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Fisk's Lawyers, supra note 112.
Id.

130. Id.
131.

Editorial, Mr. David Dudley Field's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1870.
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Fisk and his cohort, Field was assisting his clients in committing new
crimes, in continuing to defraud shareholders, bribe lawmakers, and harm
the public. Fisk was "determined to persevere in a course of cheating and
robbery" and the lawyers were advising him on how to "dodge" the law
as they did so.' 3 2 The New York Times insisted in editorial after editorial
that what set Field apart from criminal defense lawyers was that he
entered the court "in suits in which his clients are known to be in collusion
with the judge."' 33
In a series of articles, the left wing paper, The Nation, like the New
York Times, sided with Bowles. It criticized Field, while elaborating a
more robust role for the lawyers. The editorial explained that when
lawyers defend individuals accused of a crime, they are representing not
only the interest of their client but also "the well[-]being of the
community in ensuring that every criminal is convicted through proper
means." 1 31 It explained, however, that if the "bench is in a league with
the dishonest" then "any lawyer who carries a dishonest man's case
before the bench does ipso facto connive at the fraud."l 35 That situation,
the Nation proclaimed, has arisen in New York. The article concluded
that Fisk and Gould's claim to legal assistance ought to be balanced by
the "higher claims of public morality" because "their power .

.

. [had]

become so great as to rise them to all intents and purposes above the
courts and the legislature."' 36
The Nation was not the only publication to respond to the
correspondence between Field and Bowles. Nor did it articulate the only
view. George Ticknor Curtis, a Massachusetts lawyer and politician,
defended Field in a long and technical recitation of the complex facts of
the dispute.1 37 Francis Barlow wrote three letters, originally printed in the
New York HeraldTribune, taking the opposite view.1 38
The debate might sound familiar. It is strikingly similar to the outcry
over Charles Stimson's public statement that corporate executives ought
132.

Id.

133.

Editorial, DavidDudley Field: More About His Connection with the Erie Suits, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 10, 1871.
134.

ForensicEthics, NATION, Jan. 26, 1871, at 56.

135. Id. This is essentially the argument that William Simon makes. Simon argues that
lawyers can only ethically represent their clients in an adversarial way with no regard for the
ultimate justice of the cause or the outcome if the system is working perfectly. If, however, the
institutions and procedures are defective then that sort of attitude toward representations would
only result in the exacerbation of already skewed results. Ethical Discretion, supra note 42, at

1090-119.
136.

ForensicEthics, supra note 134, at 57.

137.

See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, AN

INQUIRY INTO THE ALBANY & SUSQUEHANNA

RAILROAD LITIGATIONS OF 1869: AND MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD'S CONNECTION THEREWITH

(1871).
138.
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to force prestigious law firms to choose between their lucrative retainers
and representing accused terrorists. 139 While the notion of independence
does not present an easy solution, it does provide a language for the
argument. This was, at heart, a debate about the meaning of the
independence of the bar. Field invoked the term to mean that lawyers are
independent of their clients so that a legal representation never involves
a personal endorsement of the client's activities or values. By defending
a client or championing his cause, the lawyer is nobly playing his part in
the justice system. Bowles had a different idea, one that was perhaps
closer to its meaning in civic republican discourse and one that certainly
seemed more in tune with popular opinion at the time. Independence from
the client is not a good in itself. It is, rather, productive because it enables
a lawyer to choose clients and represent them in a way that would help
articulate, maintain, and promote a clear idea of what is good for all.
The correspondence between Field and Bowles illustrates how the
notion of independence encouraged critics to think critically about the
role that the legal profession played in the rise of business and the ills of
the market. In representing clients, arguing about the meaning and scope
of the law, lawyers were inevitably entangled in this central struggle.
Independence gave them the language to address and argue over how the
profession and the legal system could best shape the future. Bowles
insisted that lawyers had a direct role to play, by choosing clients and
deciding how to represent those clients, in addressing the failures in the
marketplace. Field agreed that lawyers played such a role but insisted that
they did so by making sure that courts, law, and justice were accessible
to all.
B. The Legal Services Bureau
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson established the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) as a part of the Great Society designed to
address poverty and racial injustice. 140 The OEO established and funded
legal service agencies throughout America.141 Prior to this radical
initiative, the poor had to make do with the inadequate services provided
by private charities and municipal governments.1 42 The OEO coupled its
139. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007.
140. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE & REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM 41 (1974).
14 1. Id.

142. ABEL, supra note 4, at 128. Prior to 1875, legal services were largely left to the
voluntary activities of unorganized lawyers. Roger C. Crampton, Crisis in Legal Services for the

Poor, 26 VILL. L. REv. 521, 523 (1981). These organizations were underfunded and disorganized.
Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation,61 CORNELL L. REV. 681,
682 (1975). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, voluntary organizations grew up

in the inner cities to help coordinate these charitable acts. Crampton, supra, at 523-24. The nation
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objective of providing legal assistance to the poor with a more radical
agenda to achieve social justice through law reform, income
redistribution, and the political organization of the poor.1 43
The organized bar reluctantly supported OEO, voicing its concern
about how the federally funded initiative threatened lawyers'
independence. 14 4 How could lawyers adequately challenge the
government if it paid their salaries? 45 The Bar's fear turned out to be
unfounded. From the outset, state governments expressed panic over the
extent of the organization's independence. 14 6 These young attorneys were
aggressive and resourceful. They challenged the government in court
battles, which threatened to dismantle the status quo.1 4 7 The OEO
affiliated state organizations faced political battles. Legislatures
threatened to cut their funding.14 8 States introduced bills to forbid these
organizations from suing the state government.1 49
Like Dr. Frankenstein and his monster, the federal government
similarly sought to curb what it saw as the excessive conduct of these
organizations. By the early 1970s, President Nixon began to chip away at
the OEO organizations.' 5 0 To protect the embattled organizations,
congressmen sought to establish a federal Legal Services Corporation
through legislation with a broad mandate to address equal access to
justice. The law, which ultimately passed in 1974, established a federal
board of experts to oversee what was supposed to function as an
independent organization.s'5 In its initial iteration, the LSC was designed
to address large structural problems facing the poor as well as societal
issues that deepened the divide between the wealthy and those in need.1 52
So, the initial crew of lawyers received two-year fellowships to think up
innovative litigation, class actions, and legislative initiatives. 153 It was not
did not really begin to address the problem of the unmet need for legal services until after the
Supreme Court decided that indigent defendants in criminal cases were entitled to counsel. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
143.
144.

Crampton, supra note 142, at 524.
JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 43-64.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
George, supra note 142, at 684-85.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id.

Iso.

BRYANT GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL AID AND IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 41 (1980); Lawrence J.

Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar: A Reminiscence and a Renewed Call for
Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 305, 309 (1998).

151. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2996b(a) (1994); Charles J. Cooper & Michael A. Carvin, The Price of

"PoliticalIndependence": The UnconstitionalStatus of the Legal Services Corporation,4 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 13-16 (1994).

152.

George, supra note 142, at 683-84.

153.

Fox, supra note 150, at 306-12; EARL S. JOHNSON JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE
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conceived, at first, primarily as a way to provide individuals with access
to legal services like estate planning and divorces but rather a broad
governmental initiative to enable creative legal approaches to the
problem of poverty in the United States.' 54
At first the American Bar Association resisted the idea of a federally
funded legal services organization.15 5 Particularly in the 1950s, the bar
seemed concerned about turning our robust democracy into something
that more closely resembled a communist state. The haunting presence of
the Soviet Union in the 1950s fueled the debate.1 56 Even after the
proposal, the Bar reserved support, expressing concern that the lawyers
who represented clients against the interest of the lawyers' employer
would lack the requisite independence. Despite its initial opposition, the
Bar ultimately supported the proposal. Judge Jack Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York, explained:
There is always a danger that when government is funding a
program, it will cut off funds when the attacks on government
become effective. When government is controlled by a majority
whose views differ substantially from the views of the minority,
there is a possibility -- without an independent counterforce or
series of forces such as those provided by independent lawyers-that there will be an explosive rending of the whole fabric of
society.

57

The fundamental issue then was how vulnerable a lawyer's
independence was, how susceptible to decay under the proposed
structural arrangement. 5 8 In Judge Weinstein's view, the country had no
FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
154. Fox, supra note 150, at 306-12; JOHNSON, supra note 153.

155. The idea was around as early as 1950. The President of the American Bar Association
denounced the proposal on the ground that it would threaten the independence of lawyers. Harold
Gallagher,President'sPage, 36 A.B.A. J. 210 (Mar. 1950) ("To serve clients and the public weal,
lawyers must be free of bias and government control. With government subsidies come

government control and the loss of freedom.").
156. Editorial, Legal Profession vs. Regimentation, 37 A.B.A. J. 103, 168 (Feb. 1951)
(comparing a federally funded legal services program to the "state controlled legal profession
behind the Iron Curtain."). See also Editorial,LegalAid in New Jersey: TheAnswer to a Socialized

Legal Profession, 36 A.B.A. J. 355, 356 (1950) (arguing against state funded legal aid because it
compromises "independence.").

157. Comment, The Legal ProfessionGridsfor the 1970s, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 75,
99 (1971-72).
158. Powerful established interests do not like an independent bar and take any opportunity
they can to hobble it. For example, regulated industries attempted to dismantle clinical education
when the clinics started to represent clients who posed a threat on issues such as environmental
justice. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on ProgressivePublic-Interest

Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 209,236-41 (2003). Despite the David and Goliath like battle, the bar
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choice but to depend on the fact or the hope that professional
independence was more an aspect of collective identity then something
so easily undermined by the structure of a lawyer's employment.1 59 He
explained that he was forced to suspend his own skepticism because of
how indispensable lawyers' independence was to a democratic
government.1 60

As it wove its way through history, the greatest hope for the LSC was
never truly met. Its vision was obscured by other things. The story of its
decline has been told. The optimism of President Johnson's vision has
certainly been lost.161 The role of the organized bar was initially less than
heroic. It resisted the LSC but never proposed an alternative way to
address the inequality in wealth or the unequal access to justice that is
now a quite well accepted reality.' 6 2 Instead, the ABA claimed that the
federally funded organization lacked independence.1 63 The bar worried
that it would not truly be able to stand up to the government for the rights
of the poor because it was beholden to Congress for its existence and
funding.1 64
This is true. But there is more to the story. Lawyers' independence
shaped the debate over the LSC and was a more productive concept than
most have acknowledged. In 1972, Vice President Spiro Agnew launched
his own personal battle over the LSC.1 6 5 He accused the bureau of
abandoning its mission of helping individual clients for a rogue social
engineering mission. He argued that the LSC had become too aggressive
in its assaults on the government:
seems to maintain its distance. This Article adds a dimension to this debate by arguing that the
bar is able to stand up to these assaults from powerful interests because its strength (or

independence) derives not from financial incentives but rather from a sense of group identity built
over time.

159. See id.
160. The disagreement over whether lawyers could remain independent when employed by
the government is essentially a dispute about whether independence is a personal or collective
quality or a product of structural relations. In other words, some, like Judge Weinstein, believed

that lawyers could remain independent regardless of who pays their bills. Others doubted this fact.
See supra text accompanying notes 157-59. For a description of this difference in opinion as to

the meaning of independence, see Harry B. Cohen, Book Review, A Southern Lawyer Looks at
Legal Services. Barlow F. Christensen, Lawyerfor People of Moderate Means: Some Problems

ofAvailability ofLegal Services, 24 VAND. L. REv. 433, 444 (1970). The author of the book claims
that a legal services attorney paid by the government can maintain independent judgment. Id. The
reviewer insists that a lawyer is beholden to his employer, regardless of his theoretical
commitments. Id.
161.
162.

See generally ABEL, supra note 4.
See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004).
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The Bar must lead a searching re-examination of the philosophical
underpinnings of the national legal services program. Instead of
ministering to the legal needs of their clients, legal services
attorneys are seeking law reform and advancing their own social,
economic and political theories. The legal services program was
not created to give lawyers a chance to be social engineers on a
grand scale.' 66
The Vice President proposed putting a censor in place to control the
work of the legal aid lawyers. He wanted a public official to ensure that
the legal service lawyers remained accountable to the public by
answering to elected officials.
In a response, which was grounded in the notion of a lawyer's
independence, William R. Klaus, a lawyer and leader in the bar
association, argued: "The basic concepts upon which the Bar of the nation
has supported the program from its beginning are being seriously
challenged in a way that, carried to its logical conclusion, would threaten
the independence of the entire profession."' 6 7 Klaus explained that Vice
President Agnew wanted the legal services lawyers to give in to control
from the government.1 68 Agnew insisted that the only possible
articulation of the public interest came from the public through its duly
elected officials. Lawyers were an illegitimate counter-majoritarian
force. The legal aid lawyers, according to the Vice President, were
unaccountable.1 69 They were betraying their clients and crusading for
their own ideological battle against poverty without consulting anyone
before doing so. Klaus argued in response that the LSC lawyers were
challenging the government to abide by laws and constitutional norms
just as they should. That Agnew's attempt to control them from the top
undermined their independence.1 70 It undermined the structure of the
American government in which a group of trained educated lawyers
sought to achieve justice, fight against interest groups and factions that
inevitably control the elected officials, and force the government to
comply with the principles underlying the law.
It took a far more concerted effort on the part of the government to
de-fund LSC to impair the organization's advocacy in any significant
way. In a debilitating Act in 1996, the government forbade LSC lawyers
from participating in class actions, challenging welfare programs, or
representing individuals charged with drug offenses in public housing
166. Id.
167.

William R. Klaus, The Legal Services Program:A Reply to Vice PresidentAgnew, 58

A.B.A. J. 1178, 1178 (1972).
168. Id at 1179.
169. Agnew, supra note 165, at 930-31.
170.

Klaus, supra note 167, at 1178.
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eviction cases.17 1 It barred the lawyers from representing entire classes of
clients, like aliens and incarcerated individuals. 172 The government
refused to fund LSC organizations that engaged in these activities even if
they used non-government funds to do so. 173
Of course, this dialog occurred against a rich and complex political
backdrop. The early work of the LSC has since been criticized on many
grounds.1 74 What is important for my purposes is that this dialog itself
was valuable and that the debate revealed something about the resilience
of professional independence. Whatever one might ultimately believe,
the language of independence was necessary to counter Vice President
Agnew's position. It was necessary to defend the work of these lawyers.
Otherwise, what we are left with is unelected quasi-officials claiming the
authority of legislation to promote their own individual agendas. The
author cited the provisions of the code of professional conduct that
articulated the lawyer's professional independence. 75
The important irony in the history of the LSC is that the bar, initially
concerned that government employed lawyers would lose their
independence because the government employed them, ultimately
defended the fierce and combative independence of those very same
lawyers. Professional independence is more than a product of structural
relationships. It exists despite incentives created by attorney fees. It is an
aspect of professional identity that acts as a break on financial and other
pressures that would normally affect an individual's choices.
C. The McCarthyEra Loyalty Oaths
The standard story of the Bar's conduct during the McCarthy era is
grim. The American Bar Association stood by the government as it
chipped away at civil liberties. The Bar cooperated with the House UnAmerican Activities Committee and United States Senator Joseph
McCarthy, in their purges of those deemed to have left wing sympathies
or even attenuated connection to the communist cause. Historians have
recounted in horror how the national bar organization did not merely sit
by without protest, it actively assisted in turning over some of its
members and investigating others. It infused legal practice with
trepidation, making even the most banal of left wing sympathies or
representations the cause for suspicion. Historians and scholars have
§§ 504(11), (15), 110 Stat. 1321-54 (1996).

171.
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repeatedly asked why the bar so quickly capitulated.' 6
No one, however, has asked why so many lawyers refused to
cooperate, risking their reputation, licenses, and careers. It is certainly at
least as remarkable that groups of lawyers, local and national, invoked
professional independence and their identity as lawyers to take a stance
against the pervasive conformism of the time. Historians who have
focused on the official history of the organized bar have left this part of
the story untold. Even the ABA, which represented only a small fraction
of practicing attorneys, was deeply divided about the proper course
during the McCarthy purges, with many lawyers bravely and publicly
disagreeing with the organization's cooperation with the government."'
Different pockets within the profession successfully resisted the
powerful tide. State and local bar associations quietly refused to
cooperate. Established and prominent members of the ABA voiced
opposition to the Bar's official position. These lawyers risked their
careers and reputations to stand by attorneys who continued to represent
those accused of having communist connections or sympathies. They
were able to do so by drawing on a rich language and tradition of lawyers'
independence. They justified their stance and recruited others to join
them by invoking a professional identity that rested on the idea that the
lawyers comprised an independent force in the state, a unique calling
whose purpose was to resist pressure from popular factions and a
government, which had overstepped its bounds.
This Part amends the traditional history of the legal profession by
focusing on the issue of test oaths for lawyers. Loyalty oaths have long
been a part of American history. Simple oaths of allegiance to the state
and the constitution have been required of public employees for hundreds
of years. Lawyers swore, as they do today, to uphold the laws and
constitution of the state and federal government. But in the Cold War,
states and the federal government began pushing for a loyalty oath with
a far more explicit repudiation of the communist party and socialist
cause. 178
176.

AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 3-13. For an exception, see Liu et al., supra note 5, at

978-88 (using the Chicago Bar Association as an example to show that there was never a
consensus within the bar on how to treat the communist threat within the profession). Liu et al.

argue that the Chicago Bar Association relied on "legalism," or issues of procedure, to criticize
anti-Communist legislation in the 1950s despite internal political and ideological divisions. Id.
My history of the loyalty oaths similarly shows that organized bars were able to invoke
professionalism as a product of professional identity to take positions on controversial civil rights
issues despite the diverse interests and political divisions.
177.
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Embracing the growing panic over radicalism, in 1950, the ABA
resolved that all lawyers should have to take an oath and proclaim that
they never belonged to or associated with a communist organization. This
section recounts the history of how the bar-members of the ABA and
state and local bar association-reacted to this proposal. In doing so, it
corrects a history that has focused largely on the official proclamations
of the American Bar Association, which accounted for only 25% of all
practicing attorneys in the United States. It supplements a history that has
omitted many powerful state and local organizations as well as the
National Lawyers Guild, a radical organization of lawyers founded in
1937.
Furthermore, the ABA itself was divided. It did not comprise a
uniform reactionary front, but rather a body of practicing lawyers with
diverse views on the issue. And the Bar, for all its conformism, did
acknowledge its own internal dissent. Despite its official support of the
administration's fight against communism, the ABA proved relatively
powerless to implement its proposal over the protest of lawyers both
within the organization and outside it. The lawyers, who stood firm
against test oaths, did so by drawing on a common identity defined
critically by the notion of professional independence.
The notion of independence, the old civic republican vision, made its
way into debates about whether the profession ought to stand up for its
members who were disbarred for even attenuated association with left
wing political associations. It informed the discussion over whether the
Bar ought to take a stand collectively on civil rights issues. Like the
discussion about David Dudley Field's representation of the Erie
Railroad officials and the controversy over the LSC, this debate depended
on professional identity, which in turn rested on an evolving
understanding of professional independence.
One of the cornerstones of the traditional account of the Bar's
ignominious retreat from principle during the Cold War is its response to
loyalty oaths. In 1950, the Bar issued a resolution calling on the states to
implement loyalty oaths, including an explicit repudiation of
communism, for applicants to the bar and practicing lawyers.1 79
1935-1965, at 29 (2006); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

334 (2002).
179. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, Sept. 18-22, 1950, 36 A.B.A. J. 948, 972
(1950). The resolution specifically stated that:
The legislature, the court or other appropriate authority of each state or territory
and the District of Columbia, be requested to require each member of its Bar,
within a reasonable time and periodically thereafter, to file an affidavit stating
whether he is or ever has been a member of the Communist Party or affiliated
therewith, and stating also whether he is or ever has been a member or supporter
of any organization that espouses the overthrow by force or by any illegal or
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Mimicking a growing set of laws requiring oaths for public employees
and union officials, the test oaths would have forced all applicants to the
profession as well as practicing attorneys to attest that they had never
belonged to the communist party or supported any organization that
advocated the overthrow of the American government. 8 0 If an individual
answered affirmatively, it would trigger investigation and potential
disbarment proceedings.' 8
While historians have made it seem as if there were a virtual
consensus, opposition was strong and vocal. The House of Delegates
voted to adopt' 82 the resolution with no debate and there was little
discussion in the General Assembly. 83 While it is impossible to discern
the meaning of this silence, it would not be surprising given the climate
if the delegates were afraid to voice opposition at the time. Despite the
seeming support within the ABA, the position on loyalty oaths was far
from unanimous. On December 17, 1950, 27 leaders of profession
including Supreme Court Justice, Owen J. Roberts, and three former
presidents of the ABA issued a statement in opposition to the Bar's
proposal regarding loyalty oaths, which was printed in the ABA
journal.1 84 Again, it is unsurprising that most of those who signed the
statement were firmly established in the profession, insulated (at least
somewhat) from the consequences that others might face had they signed
the petition.
In the months that followed the resolution, the ABA journal printed
many of the opposing views. Vein Countryman, a professor at Yale
commented, "[i]f lawyers ever become so intimidated by inquiries into
their own loyalty that they fear to assert the constitutional rights of others
in loyalty inquiries, then indeed our liberties will be lost."' 85 Another

member insisted,

unconstitutional means, of the United States Government, or the government of

any of the states or territories of the United States; and in the event such affidavit
reveals that he is or ever has been a member of said Communist Party, or of any
such organization, that the appropriate authority promptly and thoroughly

investigate the activities and conduct of said member of the Bar to determine his
fitness for continuance as an attorney.
Id.
180.

Id; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: ATTORNEY OF THE ACLU

188-89 (1990).
18 1.

The ProposedAnti-Communist Oath: Opposition Expressed to Association's Policy,

37 A.B.A. J. 123, 123 (1951) [hereinafter The ProposedAnti-CommunistOath].
182. PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 76 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 527, 531-32 (1951)
(explaining the way in which the ABA approved the loyalty oath resolution).
183. Proceedings ofthe House ofDelegates, supra note 179, at 972.
184. The ProposedAnti-Communist Oath, supra note 18 1.

185. Vern Countryman, Loyalty Tests for Lawyers, 13 L. GUILD REv. 149, 157 (1953).
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Intellectual independence is being threatened in the U.S., by a
growing readiness to label as communistic any opposition to any
invasion of fundamental rights if the suggestion is made in the
name of "loyalty." A tendency toward hysteria may explain this
reaction in the public at large but it is shocking to see that it has
found expression in the official organ of the profession whose
purpose in society is so deeply grounded in objectivity of mind and
fearless independence of expression.186
The author identifies independence as a defining characteristic of the
legal profession, a characteristic that sets the profession apart and lends
its members a special responsibility and political mission.
As HUAC was pushing to list the National Lawyers Guild as a
subversive organization and have its members disbarred, the organization
was fighting against the test oaths. In a conference on the topic, one
editorial in the organization's periodical commented that test oaths:
would intensify the fear which already pervades the bar and create
servility among lawyers. Fewer lawyers would feel free to exercise
the ordinary rights of a citizen to participate in the discussion of
controversial public questions, or associate freely with others
when they know that in addition to the accepted social price of
non-conformity, which they must pay for such activities, they may
risk disbarment. Equally fewer lawyers would dare to discharge
their professional responsibilities toward the defense of clients
associated with unpopular causes when to do so might well result
in creating animosities or evidence which could be used against
them in a disciplinary action.18 7
The opposition cast its argument against test oaths as an effort to
preserve the independence of the bar: "The lawyer's independence is an
essential tool of his profession not only as an advocate in the courtroom
but as a spokesman for the public interest and defender of popular
liberty."' 8 8 The central concern was independence not from the client but
rather from the government. The fear, as the author of this report noted,
was that test oaths would create a docile bar. It would turn the lawyer into
''an apologist for the government rather than a defender of the
Constitution."l89

The opposition to loyalty oaths was not only the brave if marginal
186.
(1950).

James E. Thomas, Disapprovalof Oathfor Members of the Bar, 37 A.B.A. J. 474, 474

187.

The Independence ofthe Bar, 13 LAW. GUILD REV. 158, 171 (1953).

188.
189.

Id.
Id. at 172.
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response of a left wing legal organization. States, for the most part,
declined to adopt test oaths of the type the ABA had proposed. Only a
handful of states adopted test oaths and seventeen states explicitly
rejected them.1 90 In practice, state and local bar associations may have
given some nominal attention to inquiries into applicant's political
affiliations, but most bar examiners reported that they had not denied any
applicants to the bar on the basis of membership or affiliation with any
left wing organization. 1 9
In December 1950, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
issued a report and resolution opposing test oaths for lawyers.' 9 2
Reprinted in the ABA Journal, the report insisted that the oath to uphold
the laws and constitutions of the state and county, which every lawyer
was already obliged to take, was sufficient.1 93 The resolution went on to
explain that the test oath would "lessen the freedom of the Bar to accept
the responsibility of representing unpopular causes." 94 The Kings
County Bar Association, the New York State Bar Association, and the
Massachusetts Bar Association all issued similar resolutions opposing the
specific anti-subversive loyalty oaths for lawyers.' 9 5 The ABA reported
in an editorial the Kings County Bar Association official statement
rejecting the oaths: "Whereas, such loyalty oaths would unjustly and
falsely cast a suspicion of disloyalty on the entire legal profession, and
divert the attention of Bar Associations from a constructive program of
making secure the Bill of Rights, into the blind and dirty alleys of
snooping, rumor-mongering and witch hunting." 96
While the initial reaction in the paranoid moment was often to strike
out at lawyers with left wing sympathies, what is truly remarkable is not
the capitulation but rather the fact that state bars and courts on the whole
did not pursue "disloyal" lawyers. They did not share the official fervor
of the national bar association or if they did, they did not act on it. In
190.

Ralph S. Brown Jr. & John D. Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U.

CHI. L. REv. 480, 483-97 (1952-1953). In 1950, a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of a

provision of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, requiring union officials to file an
affidavit declaring that they had never belonged to a communist organization in order to obtain
recognition from the National Labor Relations Board. Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950). In 1952, however, the Supreme Court found that Ohio's test oath for public employees
was unconstitutionally broad as it did not require that the lawyer know that the organization, which
he supported, was listed as subversive or advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government. Id at
486 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183).
191. Brown & Fassett supra note 190, at 497.
192. The Proposed Anti-Communist Oath: Opposition Expressed to the Association's
Policy, 37 A.B.A. J. 123, 124 (1951).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 125.
195. Paul DeWitt, BarActivities, 37 A.B.A. J. 475, 475 (1951).
196. Id.
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1920, Jacob Margolis, a well-known lawyer and Bolshevik activist, was
disbarred in Philadelphia. 9 7 Daniel O'Connell was disbarred in
California after he was convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act that same
year.1 98 In 1949, five states proceeded against the lawyers who were
charged with contempt in representing the defendants accused of
violating the Smith Act.1 99 Only one of the five was ultimately
disbarred.20 0 In an era in which fear replaced trust and neighbors turned
against each other, the profession in fact capitulated in sporadic symbolic
acts, rather than in any systematic way. One Lawyers Guild member
noted that the profession mostly realized that disbarment for
representation of politically unpopular causes poses a "latent, potent
menace to the independence of the bar." 20 1
In 1955, the Florida Bar Association disbarred Leo Sheiner for failing
to answer questions posed by the House Un-American Activities
Committee of the U.S. Senate regarding his association with the
Communist Party. 20 2 In a summary opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
ultimately held that the state had failed to meet its burden to prove that
Sheiner was unfit to practice law. 203 The National Lawyers Guild
submitted an amicus brief to the Florida Supreme Court in support of
Sheiner. 204 The brief insisted that in order to protect civil rights and
liberties, the "independence of the bar [must] be maintained intact."2 05
The brief argued that, "[a]n intimidated bar, a bar coerced into political
conformity, a bar subjected to harrying inquisitions will lack the courage
and independence to fulfill one of its prime historical functions." 20 6
The American Bar Association took the opposite view. 20 7 It explained,
197. Dreyfus & Walker, supra note 200, at 67.
198. Id. at 68.
199. Id.
200.

Abraham J. Isserman was barred from practice in federal court and then disbarred by

New Jersey in summary proceeding. 9 N.J. 269. The Bar Association of the City of New York
instituted proceedings for the disbarment of Henry Sacher. He was initially ordered disbarred in
the Southern District of New York but the Supreme Court remanded saying disbarment was too

severe. Philadelphia investigated Louis McCabe and decided no action was appropriate. Michigan
reached the same conclusion with regard to George Crokett. California similarly decided no action
was appropriate for Richard Gladstein. Benjamin Dreyfus & Doris Brin Walker, Grounds and
Proceduresfor DisciplineofLawyers, 18 LAW.

GUILD

REv. 57, 68 (1958).

201. Id. at 69.
202. David L. Weissman, The Proceedings to Disbar Leo Sheiner: A Story of Judicial
Maladministration,with a PortraitofInformer Joseph D. Mazzei, 16 LAW. GUILD REV. 137, 137

(1956).
203.
204.

Florida v. Sheiner, 112 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1959).
Amicus Curiae Brief to the Supreme Court of Florida, reprintedin 15 LAW. GUILD

REV.

11 (1955).
205. Id. at 11.
206.

Id. (citing Justice Black, The Lawyer and Individual Freedom, TN. L. REv. (1950)).

207. Id. at 23.
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The rights of an individual - whatever his profession, calling, or
office - might not be consistent with his professional or official
status. Where consistent there is no problem, where, however, the
individual rights are inconsistent, a choice becomes necessary
either to forgo the individual right or relinquish the profession or
office. 20 8
Homogeneity was clearly a priority. Diversity of views, in the Bar's
official proclamation, was not only undesirable but also incompatible
with professionalism and its mandates.
This disagreement occurred just as McCarthy was launching his attack
on Fred Fisher, a young attorney who had worked briefly at the National
Lawyers Guild when he was a law student, for associating with a group,
which McCarthy characterized as a communist front organization. 209
George Anastaplo, a World War II veteran and graduate of the University
of Chicago Law School, was famously denied admission to the Illinois
bar when he insisted that communist party members should be allowed
to practice law in the United States and refused to deny his own
affiliation. 2 10 Though he had no known connection with left wing causes,
Anastaplo believed that a democracy ought to tolerate those who
advocated the violent overthrow of the government. He refused to answer
the question about his political affiliations in an interview with the Illinois
Committee on Character and Fitness. 2 1 1 Ultimately, his case made its way
to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the decision to deny
Anastaplo's admission to the bar.2 12 In dissent, Justice Black insisted that
the decision threatened the independent bar.2 13
208.

Id. at 28.

209.

For an account of this incident, see AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 237.

210. In reAnastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 827-28 (Ill. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1955),
reheard, 163 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. 1959), aff'd, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 93.
213. Id. at 114-16. Black wrote:
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the lawmen like Malsherbes, who, at the cost of his own life and the lives of his family,
sprang unafraid to the defense of Louis XVI against the fanatical leaders of the
Revolutionary government of France-men like Charles Evans Hughes, Sr., later

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who stood up for the constitutional rights of socialists
to be socialists and public officials despite the threats and clamorous protests of
self-proclaimed superpatriots-men like Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and John W.
Davis, who, while against everything for which the Communists stood, strongly
advised the Congress in 1948 that it would be unconstitutional to pass the law
then proposed to outlaw the Communist Party-men like Lord Erskine, James

Otis, Clarence Darrow, and the multitude of others who have dared to speak in
defense of causes and clients without regard to personal danger to themselves.
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The organized bar hardly hesitated in support of the government's
purge. It joined the effort with enthusiasm. But the decision was not
unanimous. Lawyers and judges, who resisted and criticized, used the
language of independence to condemn McCarthy and the official arm of
the profession. In the case of Fisher, it worked.
III. SALVAGING THE NOTION OF PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE

This Part uses the history of the profession and professional
independence in particular as a reminder of how important professional
independence has been in preserving and fighting for American
democratic values.
The current pressure to race into the future, the fear that the bar will
act (as it has done so often in the past) in a protectionist, monopolistic
way, has led to a growing sense that professional independence-like
much of the professional project-is merely subterfuge.2 14 It is a
rhetorical flourish that allows lawyers to dress self-interested policies as
publicly-minded positions.2 15 Scholars are understandably eager to align
themselves with innovation over stagnation, but in their eagerness, they
may forget that professional independence is complex. It is precisely its
mutability that has allowed the concept to be so valuable and yet so
dangerous in the past. Reconceived, the notion can continue to be critical
in the future without serving reactionary ends. The profession has an
obligation not to shape its ideals to suit a changing market and preserve
the aspects of the past that serve a vital function.
Ironically, the same features of the changing marketplace for legal
services that jeopardize professional identity and the concept of
independence may also make the notion even more critical in the future.
The global legal community is diverse. It is comprised of lawyers from
countries of all sorts with different values and different relationships
between the bar and the state. As American lawyers work more closely
with their counterparts in other countries and national boundaries erode,
it is even more important to discern what it is about our tradition that is
essential. Otherwise, the good qualities of the American legal profession
might well cave under the global pressure to conform and the market
The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not
constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a
group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is
to humiliate and degrade it.
Id. at 116.
214.

MORGAN, supra note 3, at 19-40.

215. Id.
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pressure to provide inexpensive services.216
On a fairly simple level, this Article serves as a reminder that
professional independence in its many iterations has played an important
role in American democracy. 217 It stands for valuable propositions-the
right of lawyers to represent clients with whom they do not agree to
protect liberty, the duty of lawyers to choose clients carefully with a sense
of their own role in defining and preserving the values of the
community, 2 18 the principle that lawyers must not be controlled by the
government, the idea that the bar can take a position on controversial
social issues regardless of the beliefs of individual clients-to name just
a few. While it is impossible to deny the internal tensions between the
different conceptions, this fact does not render the concept incoherent.
These three examples-the representation of the robber barons, the
founding of the Legal Services Corporation, and lawyers' reaction to the
McCarthy Era test oaths-are episodes in the history of the profession.
They cannot be used to demonstrate a clear development in the notion of
professional independence in America. What these examples can do is
provide a sketch of the different meanings of independence and more
importantly a reminder of how useful the term can be. Independence is
not just empty rhetoric. It is not just words. It describes an aspiration,
albeit a controversial and elusive one, which is necessary in an ongoing
debate about the role that lawyers inevitably play in sustaining a
democracy.
Of course, these multiple meanings are often in conflict with one
another. They are vague and manipulable but the underlying concept is
useful in shaping an ongoing conversation about the role of the
profession. It is useful, in part, because it helps form a unique
professional identity. This communal identity, in turn, provides a
mechanism for evolving self-definition. As Emile Durkheim argued, the
professions and occupations provide a way for individuals to imagine
themselves as part of a larger community in a world that was becoming
and continues to become increasingly atomized.2 19 It provides some
216.

For a discussion of the effect of globalization on legal practice, see generally Laurel S.

Terry, Trends and Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The Impact of Globalization and
Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2661 (2012). Laurel Terry, Carol Silver et al., Transnational
Legal Practice,43 INT'L LAWYER 943 (2009).

217.

For a discussion of the role of the profession in promoting the rule of law in emerging

democracies, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in
Promoting the Rule ofLaw in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 407-08

(2009).
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For a contemporary argument on this issue, see David Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the

FirstAmendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

1030, 1033 (1995) (concluding that a black lawyer should not represent the leader of the Klu Klux
Klan, despite his commitments to First Amendment rights).
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connection between the everyday problems of Americans with its broader
pronouncements of value and tradition. 2 20 In other words, the very
process of trying to figure out what independence means in any given
instance proves useful in that it encourages lawyers to imagine what their
role ought to be as society changes.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A MODERN CONCEPT OF
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE

This final section highlights how the history of the profession helps
redefine independence in a way that is both suitable to a modem and
rapidly changing legal profession and divorces the term from the
negative, monopolistic, elitist connotations of the past.
By teasing out a definition of independence, which is more suitable to
the legal profession now, this Part also begins to explore what conditions
are necessary to ensure independence. 2 2 1 The historical episodes
discussed in this Article lend insight to this puzzle by illustrating that
professional independence in its shifting and evolving meaning is a
product of professional identity formed through communal pursuit and
the common task of negotiating private interest and social norms, and that
identity in turn is largely independent of the structural relationships that
shape a lawyer's work.2 22 Understanding independence in this way has
important implications for contemporary debates.
This Part will elaborate how these episodes in the history of the
profession cast independence as a product of professional identity and it
will begin to explore the implications of this new way of looking at
professional values.
A. The CorrespondenceBetween Bowles and Field
The scuffle over Field's representation of Fisk and Gould points to a
potential, if not inevitable, tension between two different understandings
Durkheim, and C.S. Peirce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities, in THE
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 180 (Thomas L. Haskell ed., 1933);
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 49 (George Simpson trans. 1933) (1893).

220.

This was essentially that the functional sociologists made by the structural functionalist

sociologists. ABEL, supra note 6, at 33-39.

221. Others have begun to answer this question. Most importantly, Robert Gordon has
provided a crucial piece of the puzzle. Gordon, supra note 29.
222. Scholars of the profession tend to view independence and other values unique to the
profession as a part of the profession's (or judicial system's) legitimacy. See generally WENDEL,
supra note 35; LUBAN, Supra note 42; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY
OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (2000); MARKOVITS, supra note 4. This Article shifts the debate by focusing

instead on evolving group identity and its attributes.
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of professional independence. Field insisted that by representing the
robber barons he was living up to this ideal.2 23 He did not embrace or
endorse his clients' conduct, 224 but he leant his considerable expertise to
their cause so that the courts could sort out what was right. 22 5 According
to Field, his role was not to determine right or wrong but rather to present
the facts and argue the law as best he could so the judge could ultimately
arrive at the just solution.2 2 6 According to Field, it was Bowles' vision
that threatened professional independence by harming his reputation in
the press and suggesting that he should not have represented the robber
barons.22 7 In Field's opinion, Bowles undermined independence by
associating a lawyer with his client's cause. 228
Bowles disagreed about the meaning of independence. 229 He balked
at Field's invocation of Erskine, explaining that Erskine remained
independent of his client's cause so that he could fight for a public goodin Erskine's case free speech. 2 30 Bowles explained that Field had no such
cause. 231 His clients continued to undermine the market and defraud
investors. 232 His clients bribed judges and bought legislative votes and
judicial opinions in order to do so. 233 By representing his client, Field was
not standing up for the right to an unpopular opinion but rather assisting
ruthless businessmen in committing criminal acts.2 34 Independence, in
Bowles' opinion, was a means to an end and a state of professional
distance that allowed lawyers to pick their clients and to conduct their
cases in the interest of justice and the community as a whole. 235
Charles Stimson's remarks about prominent lawyers representing
accused terrorists and the public outcry that followed illustrates that both
the threat to independence as Field understood it and the faith in its
essential importance persist. 23 6 The fact that Stimson was ultimately
forced to resign over the flap indicates that the tide of public opinion has
shifted. Unpopular clients deserve representation. When they face the full
223.

See supra Part II.A.

224. See supra Part II.A.
225.

See supra Part II.A.

226. Field was expressing an early iteration of what William Simon would later call the
ethics of neutrality. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 Wisc. L. REv. 29,
32.
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force of the government, they may even deserve the very best
representation. Field's view, largely denounced by his contemporaries,
has come to dominate.
The historical shift in understanding of independence is important
itself.2 3 7 When the greatest perceived threat comes from a private interest,
like the robber barons, Bowles' understanding about the need to remain
independent from client interests and work toward the good of the public
tends to prevail. When the threat arises from government intrusion, then
the focus tends to shift toward a need to ensure that lawyers can represent
any client and force the government to act lawfully. Either way,
independence does manage to define the lawyer's role in preserving
liberty.
The conversation between Field and Bowles also helps to highlight
the similarity between these two seemingly opposite understandings of
professional independence. Just as Erskine was defending free speech
rather than his client, Tom Paine's, political beliefs, so too were these
prominent lawyers of Guantanamo detainees defending civil liberties
against the growing intrusion of the state. Independence was not initially
seen as a good in itself. It was valuable insofar as it enabled a professional
to use his judgment to pursue the interests of the broader community as
well as the client. At times, the two are compatible, and at others they are
not. In Bowles' view, by representing the railroad moguls, Field had
betrayed the interests of the whole by working to help a corrupt system
facilitate their manipulation of the market. 238 In Field's view, the two
were compatible because by representing his client, he was ensuring that
each client could secure a good representation. 239
The message that has been somewhat lost in the passage of time is that
independence was never intended to be an end in itself. It is not, at least
not as initially conceived, simply good to maintain distance from one's
client and his or her goals or deeds. It is good to do so only insofar as the
distance allows the lawyer to better evaluate and fight for the good of the
community as a whole. In choosing clients and selecting a strategy for
the representation, professional independence might require some eye
toward the ultimate, substantive good.24 0
237.

For a historical account of this shift, see Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual

in the Law": Fantasiesand Practicesof New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST CIVIL-WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. See supra Part II.A.

240. This is not, of course, a new observation. Critics have engaged in this discussion for
quite some time. On one hand, scholars claim that lawyers have an obligation to balance client
loyalty with a dedication to the justice and other socially valuable goals. See generally LUBAN,
supra note 42; Gordon, supranote 29; EthicalDiscretion,supra note 42. On the other hand, others
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Part of the disagreement between Field and Bowles about the meaning
of independence rests on a distinction between public and private roles.
Bowles argued that the lawyer was a public figure while Field insisted
that he was a private citizen. 2 4 1 Part of what motivated Field and perhaps
led to his different approach to independence, was the complete
delegation of moral decision-making to public or government officials. 242
In Field's view, it was the judge's job, not his own, to decide whether his
clients were bad or good, guilty or not.2 43 As contemporary critics have
pointed out, this absolute delegation of moral or political decisionmaking is problematic. 244 If, as most observers would now agree, the law
is not a fixed set of principles but rather a product of human choices and
context, then the lawyer must have some role in determining its scope and
meaning.
Ever since the New Deal, political scientists have insisted that the
divide between public and private is not so stark. 245 Lawyers, citizens,
corporations, and other occupations share in the role of governance.
Recently, legal scholars have picked up on this point as well.24 6 If this is
so, at least a partial return to Bowles' view of the professional would suit
the current understanding of how a democratic country is governed. At
times and in certain contexts such as criminal defense work, it may be
that the best way for an attorney to protect the rule of law is to represent
even the most despised person. However, at other times, as in the case of
the robber barons, perhaps it would be better to exercise a different sort
of independence, focusing on how to use one's talents to promote rather
than undermine the law.
The history of independence contributes to the debate over the proper
relationship between lawyers and their clients and professional ethics and
morality. Most moral philosophers and legal ethicists focus on justice,2 4 7
Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.

1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral EthicalRole: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. Bowles' and Field's disagreement over the
meaning of professional independence, however, sheds new light on the issue.
241. For background on the evolution of the notion of public and private, see MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 1870-

1960, at 3-33 (1992).
242. See supraPart II.A.
243.
244.

See supra Part II.A.
LUBAN, supra note 42; SIMON, supra note 222; WENDEL, supra note 35.

245. Rebecca Roiphe, The Most Dangerous Profession, 39 CONN. L. REv. 603, 605-29
(2006).
246.

Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in

Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New
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the politics of law-making, 2 4 8 or the legitimacy of the system249 to argue
that lawyers should be more or less beholden to the will of their clients.
Daniel Markovits, for instance, argues that the legitimacy of the
adjudicatory system depends on the lawyer's ability to suspend his own
personal morality and inclinations to effectuate his client's goals. 2 5 0
David Luban and William Simon, on the other hand, emphasize justice
in arguing that the lawyer has an obligation and responsibility to the
ultimate outcome of the representation.2 ' W. Bradley Wendel grounds
legal ethics in politics and law making rather than morality. 25 2
While not necessarily inconsistent with any of these theories, my
focus on independence as an aspect of identity shifts the debate.
Markovits's argument fails not necessarily because it abandons justice or
rule of law principles but rather because it misconstrues the identity of
the lawyer. While Markovits prides himself on accurately describing the
practicing bar, he caricatures what it is that lawyers do. 25 3 His conception
deprives lawyers of their role in negotiating their own personal morality
and social or cultural beliefs with that of the client and the dictates of the
law. It is this inevitable back and forth, negotiation of opposite principles,
and the fluidity or multiplicity of identity that holds the profession
together and helps it to serve as a mediator between private interests and
the dictates of the law. 2 5 4 The identification with the client combined with
a distance grounded in professional identity forces the lawyer to negotiate
the client's interest with something that one could characterize as the law
or the public interest.
Lurking beneath this debate has always been some question or
implication about the effect of increased diversity on the legal profession.
In most accounts of the decline of the profession, there is at least some
sense that its increasingly differentiated ranks make the cohesion and
public stature of the profession difficult if not impossible.2 5 5 Anthony
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Kronman, most notably, attributed the decline of the public profession to
the newcomers, immigrants, and minorities who now populate its
ranks. 25 6 Markovits, whose account allows for a meager role for lawyers,
more recently cites diversity within the profession as the reason why
lawyers can no longer live a meaningful, fulfilling life. 25 7
By casting independence as an aspect of identity, my account provides
a counter-narrative. Independence, reconceived as an aspect of identity,
is an almost inevitable process of negotiation between the client's
interests, the lawyer's personal convictions, and the will of the people
articulated through the law. Understood in this way, the lawyer never
succumbs to any one particular view, because her job requires her to
inhabit multiple perspectives at once. This understanding of
independence does not remain agnostic as to the diversity of the
profession and the population in modem America, but rather celebrates it
as a condition in which independence, understood as a product of a
complex identity, can thrive. The legal profession must maintain its
identity and integrity but in this scheme, it need not isolate itself in order
to do so. In fact, its identity is inherent in lawyers' constant exposure to
different views and perspectives. Independence requires a lawyer who is
constantly shifting perspectives by inhabiting his prior assumptions, his
client's views, and that of the law in rapid sequence. Given this
understanding, then diversity is a positive good not a cause for concern.
This new understanding of independence is more suitable to a
changing modem legal profession. Rather than suppress or lament
diversity or yearn for insularity among practitioners, it celebrates the
unique ability of lawyers to move in and out of different and often
conflicting perspectives. 25 8 Rather than experience it as a threat to a
meaningful life or a worthy practice, diversity becomes a cornerstone of
legal practice and the key to independence. It is not that lawyers, unlike
businessmen, are uniquely selfless or talented in assessing the public
good, it is that the work lawyers do requires them to inhabit and negotiate
multiple beliefs, practices, and commitments that process fosters
independence.
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B. A FederallyFundedLegal Service Corporation
The controversy over the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) similarly
sheds light on the contemporary debate over independence. 29 Those who
opposed the idea of the LSC were concerned that the structural
relationship between the government and the organization would
undermine the independence of the staff attorneys. 26 0 They were
concerned that the legal service attorneys would not be able to stand up
to the government, forcing it to behave lawfully and fairly toward the
country's poor. 2 6 1 The structural relationship between the government
and its employees, the legal services lawyers, would preclude such
independence.2 6 2 In the end, this proved an unnecessary fear.2 63 It was so
far from the reality that Vice President Agnew voiced his increasing
concern that the lawyers were somehow unaccountable.2 6 4 They were
presenting such a formidable challenge to the administration that Agnew
accused the LSC lawyers of being too independent. 2 6 5
This example suggests that independence may not be a product of a
structural arrangement but rather an aspect of professional identity. This
group identity can, in fact, serve as a bulwark against an attempt to
undermine the lawyer's role in defending the law and public interest. The
government, after all, was unsuccessful in crusading against the lawyers
it funded based on the assertion that they had become too independent.2 6 6
The strength of the lawyers' views about the meaning and promise of the
laws were fierce and not easily undermined by threats or even fairly
severe changes to the funding of their services.
This episode in the history of the profession shows that the mounting
concern over the danger that multidisciplinary practice and outside
funding of law firms pose must be overblown. If the government officials
who directly paid the lawyers' salaries in the early 1970s could not
control their employees from their spirited attack on government policies
then it is certainly logical (if not necessary) to conclude that working with
and receiving investments from non-lawyers might similarly prove to
have little effect on independent professional judgment.
259.
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Once we reconceive of independence as an aspect of group identity,
which can serve useful goals, it becomes clear that the profession would
be well served with more research on how professional identity is created
and fostered. 267
Echoes of the LSC episode remain. For instance, fairly recently,
regulated industries attacked law school clinics, which represented clients
in environmental cases. 268 The clinicians and their students were lending
clients the tools to undermine the interests of wealthy industries.
Powerful interests do not like an independent bar when it represents those
out of power challenging their position of authority. The same interests
will invariably try to use political power to hobble their opponents by
restricting their access to lawyers. Despite these attempts, the bar persists
in its effort to oppose power-both in the form of powerful economic
interests and the government. It does so, I argue, because of a continuing
(though contested) group identity, which includes a commitment to
independence, an independence which requires the negotiation between
client interests, the lawyer's own moral and political commitments, along
with the dictates of the law.
If we care that lawyers maintain sufficient independence from the
government to challenge the legality of its actions and sufficient distance
from private factions to confront their concentration of wealth, what
should we do? What conditions will best promote an independent legal
profession? I have suggested that the ABA is wrong in assuming that
lawyers' proximity to other professionals and external sources of funding
are the critical factor.
C. The McCarthyEra
If, as the previous section demonstrates, structural relationships, like
the sources of funding for legal services, do not compromise professional
independence, then what does? The revised history of the McCarthy Era
loyalty oaths helps to answer that question. 269 A purge of the ranks of the
profession of those who represent people with diverse and unpopular
political views is a clear assault on a profession that has defined itself as
independent from political control. It denies the profession the ability to
negotiate between different perspectives and values, by refusing to allow
lawyers to represent those with views different from their own and
267. Psychologists and sociologists have developed multiple theories on individual and
group identity formation. Erik Erikson developed a foundational theory. ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY
AND THE LIFE CYCLE (1980). Others have built on Erikson's theory of identity formation to
develop theories of group identity. See, e.g., HAROLD R. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE (1975).
268. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on ProgressivePublic Interest

Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 236-40 (2003).
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distinct from those embraced by a majority of the public. Independence,
reconceived as the work lawyers do in balancing their own beliefs with
those of the client and the dictates of the law, cannot exist under these
conditions. The government intentionally conflated the lawyer with the
client and forbade the tension with a mainstream ideological consensus.
As many of those who objected at the time noted, the profession is
supposed to defend rights and liberties, to stand up for common interests
even when those interests are not popular. 270 Lawyers are supposed to
negotiate private interest with public good. The oaths directly
compromised that central function of lawyers and stripped the profession
of a way to understand its work and its unique relation to the law and
democracy.
This Part shows that the profession is far more resilient than we seem
to let on. Professional identity, while never monolithic, is one of the axes
along which individuals choose to define themselves. Religion, gender,
ethnicity, and political beliefs are others. Professional identity is only one
piece of a complex puzzle. But the diversity of reactions to the McCarthy
Era loyalty oaths show that professional identity has the potential to shape
choices and action, even when there is a great deal of pressure. Some
lawyers, bar associations, and professional political groups drew on their
sense of the role of lawyers as an independent legal profession to resist
the intense political pressure to avoid controversial cases and clients. 27 1
This Part also sheds light on the perennial debate illustrated by the
Bowles and Fields correspondence. The flexibility of independence
allows it to adapt to different times and different concerns. When the
threat to democratic values comes from powerful private factions then
Bowles' conception of independence as the right to choose clients to
support the good of the community prevails. 2 72 When the danger comes
from government repression, as in the McCarthy era, then the bar and the
public tend to echo Fields's concern about the right of lawyers to
represent even the most despised client to protect liberty from
government overreaching. 273
CONCLUSION

Reconceiving professional independence as an aspect of group
identity rather than an ideology based on the distinction between law and
business serves several purposes. First, it helps preserve the positive
aspects of professionalism without perpetuating the protectionist and
270.
271.
272.
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elitist uses for which the notion of professional independence has been
used in the past. Second, it focuses the ongoing debate about the future
of the profession and legal education, allowing room for the profession
not only to embrace the changing nature of legal services but also to shape
it. Finally, it contributes to an ongoing debate about the role of lawyers
in a democratic state.
Many contemporary scholars of the legal profession in America
criticize the Bar for resisting proposals to deregulate the profession in
ways that might make the delivery of legal services more efficient and
help provide a greater number of people with access to the justice
system. 274 It is misguided to use professional independence to support
proposals that seem to preserve professional prerogatives at the cost of
the public's access to justice.2 7 5 The ABA has invoked independence to
resist proposals that would allow innovations, such as multidisciplinary
practice, 276 alternative litigation financing, 2 77 and outside investment in
law firms. 2 7 8 If independence, as I have argued, is not created by
structural relationships but rather through group identity, then the ABA's
fear is not only unwarranted but also counterproductive. Lawyers'
identity as a group working to realize clients' interests in the context of
group norms will be strengthened, not weakened, by proposals that will
increase the efficiency of legal services and ensure that a greater number
of individuals have access to the justice system. Identity is not necessarily
insular. It can, in fact, be reinforced by interaction with others who have
a different background, training, and focus. 279
As I have argued, professional independence is valuable, but the
proximity to non-lawyers is not the real threat to that independence.
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Refraining independence as an aspect of identity helps to refocus
concern. We should focus our attention not on inhibiting innovation in
the practice of law but rather on promoting a shared identity. One way to
do so is by looking at how lawyers are socialized. Legal education is
important, not only in preparing lawyers intellectually for the practice of
law, but also in lending them a sense of group identity. There are multiple
proposals to segment and specialize legal education. 280 In embracing
innovation in education, we need to spend more time thinking about the
core that unites all lawyers and how to promote and instill those values
in law school and afterwards.
People have never been particularly fond of the legal profession and
at least according to some, the reputation of the profession is just getting
worse. 2 81 As Markovits points out in his book on adversary ethics,
lawyers, unlike doctors, are not clearly useful and beneficial.2 8 It is the
nature of the adversary system that makes lawyers more of an acquired
taste.2 83 If you are fighting on behalf of a client then, as Markovits
explains, you are likely to lie and cheat on behalf of your client even when
doing so does not advance any general public cause. 284 While several
thoughtful critics have taken issue with this thesis, 2 85 it is certainly true
that lawyers get a bad reputation for achieving what might be an unjust
outcome on behalf of a client who pays their bills.
For years, scholars have debated the role that lawyers ought to play in
a democratic society. Reconceiving independence as an aspect of group
identity contributes to this debate by shifting the nature of the discussion
somewhat. Recently, scholars have attempted to redeem lawyers' roles as
adversaries. 286 By doing so, these scholars celebrate pluralism and
criticize any attempt to establish one metric ofjustice on the grounds that
value is by definition plural. 2 87 By reconceiving professional
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independence as an aspect of group identity, this Article shifts the debate
somewhat. There is no doubt that value is plural. This Article's
conception of professionalism asserts that while common, shared values,
or morality is elusive, it is real. Ironically, it is precisely by exploring and
embracing the plurality of value that lawyers can edge toward a common
good.
Lawyers, unlike any other profession, are constantly negotiating
different and often opposing views. In the real world, they filter their own
beliefs and convictions with their client's. Whatever emerges from that
negotiation in turn has to be realized in light of the law. This multiplicity
of perspectives is unique to the legal profession and lends it a kind of
independence, which is one way to approximate morality, justice, or
shared norms.

kind of consensus to emerge from pluralism rather than accepting the balkanization of all value.

